Fiscal policy and asset prices by Agnello, Luca & Sousa, Ricardo M.
                             
“Fiscal Policy and Asset Prices” 
 
 
Luca Agnello 
Ricardo M. Sousa 
 
 
NIPE WP 25/ 2010 
 
“Fiscal Policy and Asset Prices” 
 
 
 
 
Luca Agnello 
Ricardo M. Sousa 
 
   
 
 
 
 
        NIPE* WP 25/ 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
URL: 
http://www.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/nipe 
                                                 
* NIPE – Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas – is supported by the Portuguese Foundation for 
Science and Technology through the Programa Operacional Ciência, Teconologia e Inovação (POCI 2010) of the 
Quadro Comunitário de Apoio III, which is financed by FEDER and Portuguese funds. 
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Abstract
We assess the role played by scal policy in explaining the dynamics of asset markets. Using a
panel of ten industrialized countries, we show that a positive scal shock has a negative impact in
both stock and housing prices. However, while stock prices immediately adjust to the shock and
the e¤ect of scal policy is temporary, housing prices gradually and persistently fall. As a result,
the attempts of scal policy to mitigate stock price developments may severely de-stabilize housing
markets. The empirical ndings also point to: (i) a contractionary e¤ect of scal policy on output
in line with the existence of crowding-out e¤ects; (ii) a weakening of the e¤ectiveness of scal policy
in recent times; (iii) signicant scal multiplier e¤ects in the context of severe housing busts; and
(iv) an increase of the sensitivity of asset prices to scal policy shocks following the process of
nancial deregulation and mortgage liberalization. Finally, the evidence suggests that changes in
equity prices may help governments towards consolidation of public nances.
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1 Introduction
Over the last decades, important historical events have captured the attention of academics, governments
and policy makers towards scal policy. The tax cuts during Reagans presidency in the U.S. and the
scal consolidations in Europe linked to the Maastricht convergence criteria, the Economic Growth and
Stability Pact are just a few examples of the renewed interest on the role of scal policy as a tool for
stabilizing the economy and its potential e¤ects on asset markets.
More recently, the sudden occurrence of the global nancial turmoil, its severity and potentially long-
lasting impact, became key elements for assessing the role that external inuences, oil prices, private
investment, stock and credit markets or even duration dependence play on the likelihood of an expansion
and contraction ending (Castro, 2009; Agnello and Nerlich, 2010). As a result, a prompt answer from
monetary policy and large scal stimulus have become important ingredients of the attempt to recover
economic activity. Notably, these interventions pose major challenges because they represent an valuable
test to the long-term (un)sustainability of public accounts as the evidence on current developments in
government bond markets shows (Hallett, 2008; Hallett and Lewis, 2008; Hallett et al., 2008; Schuknecht
et al., 2009). Moreover, they may lead to business cycle de-synchronization (Raq and Mallick, 2008;
Mallick and Mohsin, 2007, 2010) or negatively a¤ect the nexus between monetary stability and nancial
stability (Castro, 2008; Granville and Mallick, 2009; Sousa, 2010a).
The behaviour of asset markets is indeed of major importance for nancial institutions, homeowners,
monetary authorities and policy makers. In addition, the linkages between the nancial markets and
the banking system, the housing sector, the credit market, and the monetary framework have emerged
very strongly and powerfully in the course of the nancial turmoil. Not surprisingly, the relationship
between macroeconomic variables, wealth, and asset returns has revived the interest on the topic by
academics (Schuknecht et al., 2009; Sousa, 2010b).
Yet, our understanding of the transmission of scal policy innovations to asset markets is far from
complete. More importantly, despite the analysis of the macroeconomic e¤ects of scal policy and the
importance of asset markets over the business cycle, there is still an important gap in the literature, in
particular, regarding the empirical relationship between scal policy actions and developments in asset
prices.
This work aims at lling that gap. Specically, its main goals is to answer the following questions:
What is the impact of scal policy on asset prices? How are stock and housing prices a¤ected by scal
policy shocks? What is the magnitude and the persistence of the e¤ects? Can scal policy be a powerful
tool towards putting the economy in the track of recovery from a deep crisis?
Our approach is empirically used to these issues in an innovative manner. First, we analyze the
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e¤ects of scal poly on asset prices using a panel of ten industrialized countries, namely, Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the U.K. and the U.S.. Second,
we use quarterly data, which allows us to identify more precisely the impact of scal policy measures.
To the best of our knowledge, such scal data set has not yet been used in the strand of economic
modelling embodied in the paper. This is also a novelty with respect to the related literature which,
generally, focuses on annual data to analyze a broad set of countries. Third, we estimate a Panel Vector
Auto-Regression (PVAR) and, therefore, allow for unobserved individual heterogeneity, while treating
all variables in the system as endogenous. Similarly, the PVAR approach allows us to increase the
e¢ ciency of the statistical inference, which would otherwise su¤er from a small number of degrees of
freedom of the country-level Vector Auto-Regression (VAR).
Our work suggests that scal policy plays a major role in asset markets. In fact, the results show that
a positive scal shock has a negative impact in both stock and housing prices. However, the dynamics
of the reaction is quite di¤erent. In fact, stock prices immediately adjust to the shock, but the e¤ect
of scal policy is temporary and quickly erodes. Stock prices start recovering after eight quarters, in
anticipation of the positive e¤ects on output. On the contrary, the impact of scal policy on housing
prices exhibits strong persistence: housing prices gradually fall after the change in the scal stance,
the trough is reached after eight quarters, and then slowly return to their initial level. In consequence,
housing prices remain depressed even thirty quarters-ahead.
This piece of evidence has a dramatic policy implication. In the attempt of stabilizing nancial
markets and mitigating movements in stock prices, governments may negatively and persistently impact
on housing markets. Consequently, the lack of synchronization in the timing of the response of stock
and housing prices suggests that one can not use scal policy to simultaneously stabilize the two asset
markets.
The empirical ndings also point to a contractionary e¤ect of scal policy on output and the key
mechanism seems to be explained by the existence of crowding-out e¤ects: a positive scal shock leads
to an increase in the interest rate, that is, the cost of debt renancing. Nevertheless, as the shock
erodes and interest rate goes back to its initial level, output starts recovering and the response becomes
positive at longer horizons. In consequence, the use of scal policy as a tool to recover the economy
may be undermined by its contractionary e¤ects in the short-run.
While our paper focuses on the role of scal policy as a driver of asset price dynamics, one may also
question on whether asset prices inuence scal policy. We nd that the e¤ects of stock market shocks
on scal policy are greater in magnitude than the ones associated to housing prices. This, therefore,
suggests that, rather than housing market movements, changes in equity prices may decisively contribute
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to the goal of scal consolidation.
The robustness of the results is assessed in several directions. First, we show that scal policy
actions can have signicant multiplier e¤ects when undertaken in the outcome of severe housing busts,
which gives rise to the importance of the implementation of scal stimulus packages. Second, we nd
that the expansionary e¤ect of scal policy has somewhat weakened in recent times and, as a result,
asset markets have become more sensitive to a deterioration in scal stance. Third, the process of
nancial deregulation and mortgage liberalization might have contributed to the change in the degree
of e¤ectiveness of scal policy, as the competitiveness of national banking sector became strongly related
to the commitment of government to credible and sound policies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on the
relationship between scal policy and asset prices. Section 3 presents the estimation methodology.
Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 discusses the results, while Section 6 assesses the robustness of
the ndings. Finally, Section 7 concludes and summarizes the main policy implications.
2 A Brief Review of the Literature
Despite the major scal developments of the last decades, the attention of academics, central banks and
governments has been typically directed towards monetary policy and its linkage with asset markets.1 ; 2
For instance, Granville and Mallick (2009) investigate the nexus between monetary stability and nan-
cial stability. The authors show that the interest rate instrument used for ination targeting (monetary
stability) is conducive to nancial stability (proxied by the term structure of interest rates, share prices,
exchange rates, property price ination and the depositloan ratio of the banking sector). Raq and
Mallick (2008) examine the e¤ects of monetary policy shocks on output in the three largest euro area
economies Germany, France and Italy (EMU3) and show that there is a lack of homogeneity in the
responses. Sousa (2010a, 2010c) shows that, for the Euro Area as whole and the U.S., housing wealth
e¤ects associated to a monetary policy contraction are very persistent, while nancial wealth e¤ects
are of short duration. Additionally, the monetary authority pays a special attention to developments
in monetary aggregates, but the monetary policy rule also suggests the adoption of a vigilant posture
regarding nancial markets. Similarly, Castro (2008) nds evidence of nonlinearity in the monetary
policy rule, in particular, vis-a-vis nancial conditions. This, in turn, makes economies less vulnerable
to a credit crunch.
1For a summary of the empirical evidence on the impact of monetary policy on housing prices, see Aoki et al. (2004)
and Iacoviello (2005).
2For the e¤ects of monetary policy on stock prices and/or stock returns, see, for instance, Rigobon and Sack (2003),
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Bordo and Wheelock (2007), and Wongswan (2009).
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The role of scal policy in explaining both housing market developments and stock market dynam-
ics should not, however, be neglected. In fact, scal policy can a¤ect housing prices via subsidies, tax
measures and its (wealth) e¤ects on households disposable income: capital taxes on housing gains, tax
deductibility of interest payments, taxation of the imputed rental value of the house, and VAT on new
houses are just a few examples of how scal policy can dramatically impact on housing markets. In
fact, given that housing supply is typically inelastic in the short-run, scal subsidies targeted to the
acquisition of a house may end up pushing up its demand and prices. Similarly, tax deductibility of in-
terest rates may inuence the demand for mortgage debt. In addition, sounder scal positions and lower
sovereign nancing needs allow for lower interest and better nancing conditions for mortgage-loans,
while higher government indebtedness can crowd-out resources away from home-owners (Maclennan et
al., 1999).
As for the link between scal policy and stock prices, scal consolidations that lead to a permanent
and substantial fall in government debt or signal sounder scal behaviour are typically related with
increases in stock market prices (Ardagna, 2009). Similarly, scal policy measures may impact on
sovereign risk spreads and nancial markets may also be inuenced by the interaction between scal
variables and political institutions (Akitoby and Stratmann, 2008).
From the empirical point of view, the evidence on the linkages between scal policy, housing prices
and stock prices is roughly inexistent. Using Canadian data, Darrat (1990) shows that scal policy
plays an important role in determining stock market returns. Van Aarle et al. (2003) provide evidence
supporting the relationship between scal policy and stock prices. Jappelli and Pistaferri (2007) high-
light the role of scal policy measures in explaining the developments in housing markets. Ardagna
(2009) reports that scal adjustments based on expenditure reduction are related with increases in stock
market prices. Additionally, long-term government bond rates fall in periods of budget consolidation
and rise when the scal position deteriorates. For emerging markets, Akitoby and Stratmann (2008)
nd that revenue-based adjustment lowers sovereign risk spreads more than spending-based adjustment.
Financial markets also react to more to cuts in current spending than cuts in investment. Moreover,
debt-nanced spending increases sovereign risk, while tax-nanced spending lowers spreads. Arin et al.
(2009) investigate the e¤ects of various tax policy innovations on stock market returns and show that
indirect taxes have a larger e¤ect on market returns than labor taxes.
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3 Empirical Methodology
We use a Panel-data Vector Auto-Regression (PVAR) methodology to assess the e¤ects of scal policy on
asset prices. This framework combines the panel-data approach (that allows for unobserved individual
heterogeneity) with the traditional Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) approach (that treats all variables
in the system as endogenous). The rst-order VAR model is specied as follows:
Yit =  0 +  (L)Yit + fi + dc;t + "it (1)
where Yit is a vector of endogenous variables,  0 is a vector of constants,  (L) is a matrix polynomial
in the lag operator, and "it is a vector of error terms.3 The vector of endogenous variables includes
the property price index (HOUSEit), the Gross Domestic Product (GDPit), the price level (Pit), the
primary government decit (DEFit), the interest rate (IRit), and the equity price index (EQit). In
practice, it can be expressed as Yit = [HOUSEit; GDPit; Pit; DEFit; IRit; EQit]0. Our model also
allows for country-specic xed e¤ects, fi, and country-specic time dummies, dc;t, in order to capture
aggregate and country-specic macroeconomic shocks. These dummies are eliminated by subtracting
the means of each variable calculated for each country-year.
The advantage of using the PVAR approach is that it increases the e¢ ciency of the statistical
inference. In fact, the estimation of country-level VARs would su¤er from a small number of degrees
of freedom due to the lack of available data. Moreover, despite the fact that cross-country di¤erences
are disregarded in the model (as it imposes the same underlying structure for each cross-section unit),
Gavin and Theodorou (2005) note that the PVAR approach also allows one to uncover common dynamic
relationships. In addition, this problem can be overcome by introducing xed e¤ects. However, given
the correlation between the xed e¤ects and the regressors (due to the lags of the dependent variables),
the commonly used mean-di¤erencing procedure produces biased estimates (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988),
in particular, when the time dimension is small (Nickell, 1981).
We avoid the drawback of the xed e¤ects estimator by following a two-stage procedure in which: (i)
we use a forward mean-di¤erencing approach (the Helmert procedure) that removes only the mean of
all future observations available for each country-year (Arellano and Bover, 1995); and (ii) we estimate
the system by GMM, using the lags of the regressors as instruments, therefore, keeping the orthogonality
between lagged regressors and transformed variables unchanged (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Given that
the number of regressors is equal to the number of instruments, the model is "just identied" and the
system GMM is equivalent to a two-stage least squares estimator applied equation by equation (Love
3The vector of error terms, "it, has zero mean and a country-specic variance, i.
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and Zicchino, 2006).
In what concerns the impulse-response functions, we transform the system in a "recursive" VAR and
impose a triangular identication structure (Hamilton, 1994).4 We follow the usual Choleski decompo-
sition of variance-covariance matrix of residuals, and assume that the interest rate and the equity price
adjust simultaneously to shocks to scal policy, while the housing price, the GDP, and the price level
only react with a lag.
The ordering of the variables in the system and, specically, for the GDP, the price level, the primary
scal decit and the interest rate, is common in the literature on scal policy.5 Regarding asset prices,
one needs to distinguish between the ordering of equity price and housing price. The equity price was
ordered last as it refers to assets that are traded in markets where auctions take place instantaneously.
By its turn, the housing price was ordered rst in the system for the following reasons. First, housing
markets are inherently sticky and housing prices do not immediately reach the equilibrium after the scal
policy shock. Second, there is a "time-to-build" argument showing that it takes time for developers to
bring new houses to the market or to work o¤ inventories when demand increases. Third, the matching
between the needs of buyers and sellers requires time. Fourth, there are important transaction costs
inherent to trading housing up or down.
4 Data and Summary Statistics
We use quarterly data for ten industrialized countries. The data are available in the following samples:
1980:1-2007:3, for Belgium; 1970:1-2007:4, for Finland; 1970:2-2007:2, for France; 1979:1-2007:2, for
Germany; 1980:1-2007:3, for Italy; 1977:1-2007:1, for the Netherlands; 1985:1-2006:4, for Spain; 1988:1-
2007:4, for Portugal; 1955:2-2007:4, for the U.K.; and 1967:2-2007:4, for the U.S.. The main sources
are as follows:
 Property Price Index (HOUSEit). Obtained from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
 GDP (GDPt). Used as a proxy for economic activity and business cycle and provided by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (in the case of the U.S..), the O¢ ce for National Statistics (for the
U.K.), the Bank of Portugal (for Portugal) and the International Financial Statistics of the IMF
(for the remaining countries).
4The orthogonalized shocks can be interpreted as reduced-form but not as structural shocks. This could be achieved
by imposing some sort of sign restrictions (Mountford and Uhlig, 2008), long-run restrictions (Blanchard and Quah, 1989)
or short-run restrictions (Sims and Zha, 2006) and estimating the VAR at the country level. Unfortunately, the sample
sizes at the country-level are relatively short and do not allow one to be condent on the statistical inference based on
these approaches. Consequently, the PVAR approach appears to be the most appropriate framework.
5See, for instance, Fatás and Mihov (2001). Note, however, that changing the ordering of the variables does not have
a signicant impact on the results.
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 Price (Pit). Proxied by the GDP deator and provided by the International Financial Statistics
of the IMF.
 Primary Fiscal Decit (DEFit). Used as the scal policy instrument and provided by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (U.S.), the O¢ ce for National Statistics (U.K.), the Bank of Portugal
(Portugal) or typically disseminated through the monthly publications of the General Accounting
O¢ ces, Ministries of Finance, National Central Banks and National Statistical Institutes. For
the U.S., we consider the Federal Government spending and revenue, whilst, for the U.K., gures
correspond to the Public Sector. In the case of the euro area countries, we use budgetary data on
a cash basis. It normally refers to the Central Government, therefore, with the exclusion of the
Local and/or the Regional Authorities. The latest gures are also published in the Special Data
Dissemination Standard (SDDS) section of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) website, to
which euro area Member States contribute.
 Interest Rate (IRit). Proxied by the 3-month Treasury Bill rate (Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy, Spain, U.K. and U.S.), the central bank rate (Finland) and the government bond yield
(Netherlands and Portugal) and provided by the International Financial Statistics of the IMF.
 Equity Price Index (EQit). Obtained from the BIS (all countries except Portugal) and the Inter-
national Financial Statistics of the IMF (Portugal).
All variables are seasonally adjusted and expressed in natural logarithms of real terms with the
obvious exception of the interest rate. National currency data for all years prior to the switch of the
euro area countries to the euro have been converted using the xed euro conversion rate in order to
provide comparable series across time for each country.
A summary of the descriptive statistics of the variables is reported in Table 1, while a detailed
description of the data sources and data construction is provided in Appendix A. Table 1 shows that,
in general, stock prices exhibit more dispersion that housing prices, therefore, reecting the typically
larger volatility that one observes in those markets. The sample average of the government decit is
about 6.6%, that is, almost double of the threshold dened by the Maastricht criteria. Note, however,
that the sample includes countries such as the U.S. and the U.K. which are not euro area members.
Moreover, the time coverage (1970-2007) also includes observations from periods that are prior to that
set of rules that impose scal discipline.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
Variable (name) # Observ. Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Housing prices 1327 0.7074 0.4380 -0.1646 2.1659
GDP 1483 11.3303 1.3098 8.1502 13.2703
Price level 1484 3.9652 0.7436 1.7025 4.7920
Government Decit 1344 0.0661 0.1889 -0.8200 0.5999
Real interest rate 1359 2.5113 4.2617 -30.1844 34.2559
Equity prices 1332 0.9199 0.8108 -1.0211 3.4290
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Baseline Model
Given that the major goal of the paper is to assess the impact of unexpected variation in scal policy on
asset prices, we estimate the PVAR represented by system (1) after the xed e¤ects have been removed.
Table 2 summarizes the parameter estimates. It is interesting to note that the majority of the
variables included in the system (with the exception of the interest rate) exhibits a relatively strong
persistence. This may, therefore, lead to the existence of substantial di¤erences between the short-run
and the long-run responses of the variables to di¤erent shocks. In particular, in the case of scal decit,
it can also be explained by some inertia of the budgetary process.
The dynamics of housing prices is negatively correlated with real interest rates, suggesting the
negative relationship between monetary policy and this set of asset prices. The same negative linkages
can be found for stock prices, although the coe¢ cient is not statistically signicant. This probably
reects the existence of a small or temporary e¤ect of monetary policy on stock prices.
In what concerns scal policy, one can see that it positively impinges on real interest rates in a
very signicant way. This is in line with the studies that nd a positive link between decits and the
long-term interest rates (Hoelscher, 1986; Cebula and Rhodd, 1993).6 In addition, scal policy seems
to be negatively related with housing prices and positively linked with stock prices.
6 In contrast, other authors did not nd evidence of a signicant relationship between government decits and interest
rates (Barro, 1976; Evans, 1985).
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Table 2: Main results of a six-variable VAR model.
Response to
Response of HOUSEt 1 GDPt 1 Pt 1 DEFICITt 1 IRt 1 EQt 1
HOUSEt 0.9375 0.0263 0.0026 -0.0083 -0.0011 0.0073
[0.0134]*** [0.0335] [0.0085] [0.0141] [0.0003]*** [0.0065]
GDPt -0.0084 0.9574 0.0096 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0085
[0.0051]* [0.0127]*** [0.0030]*** [0.0052] [0.0001]*** [0.0024]***
Pt -0.0202 0.0587 0.9732 0.0140 0.0001 -0.0149
[0.0057]*** [0.0142]*** [0.0033]*** [0.0053]*** [0.0001] [0.0027]***
DEFICITt -0.0694 0.1178 0.0115 0.7027 0.0007 -0.0611
[0.0494] [0.1218] [0.0272] [0.0481]*** [0.0006] [0.0223]***
IRt -2.6612 -2.1828 3.8117 4.2657 0.1606 -0.9313
[1.9457] [4.6532] [1.1617]*** [1.9480]*** [0.0606]*** [0.8790]
EQt 0.0242 -0.1838 0.0510 0.0331 -0.0013 1.0299
[0.0505] [0.1388] [0.0324] [0.0442] [0.0009] [0.0265]***
Note: Six-variable VAR model is estimated by GMM. Country-time and xed e¤ects are removed prior to estimation.
Reported numbers show the coe¢ cients of regressing the row variables on lags of the column variables.
Heteroscedasticity and serial correlation robust standard errors appear in brackets.
 statistically signicant at 10% level;  at 5% level;  at 1% level.
Figure 1 plots the impulse-responses to an orthogonalized scal policy shock together with 68%
bootstrapped condence bands based on 10000 draws. It shows that asset prices react in a very di¤erent
manner to the shock in scal policy: while the e¤ect on housing prices is signicant and negative, in the
case of stock prices, the ndings do not reveal a statistically signicant e¤ect. Moreover, the response
of housing prices is highly persistent and the trough is reached after about seven quarters, but housing
prices are below their initial level for almost twenty-ve quarters. In contrast, the adjustment of stock
prices is quick and temporary.
Figure 1: Impulse-responses to a scal policy shock (Model with six variables:
HOUSEit; GDPit; Pit; DEFit; IRit; EQit).
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Interestingly, real interest rates increase temporarily and fall gradually after one quarter. This is
in line with the work of Gale and Orszag (2003) who argue that there are two important reasons for
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why budget decits may raise interest rates: (i) public decits reduce aggregate savings when private
savings do not increase by the same amount and there are no compensating foreign capital inows;
and (ii) decits increase the stock of government debt. Similarly, Kiani (2009) examines the e¤ect
of federal budget decits on long-term interest rates and emphasizes the "crowding-out" hypothesis,
whereby scal policy can negatively inuence investment expenditures on plant, equipment, research
and development and, ultimately, the long-term growth of living standards. Schuknecht et al. (2009)
also highlight the importance of the government risk premium in bond markets.
This evidence suggests that the credit channel from scal policy shocks mainly operates via the
housing market. Consistently, the temporary and immediate increase in the interest rates seems to
lead to a fall in the private sectors housing demand and, therefore, induce a downward adjustment
in housing prices. In the case of stock prices, the credit channel matters only for a short period (of
about two quarters). Notably, after the scal shock occurs, the rise in the interest rates makes the stock
market a less attractive place for the allocation of savings. As a consequence, share prices immediately
fall. However, as the shock erodes, stock prices start recovering in anticipation of the expansionary
e¤ects of scal policy on output.
Actually, GDP starts to signicantly fall for about six quarters before it gradually recovers. This is
in accordance with the work of Perotti (2004), who uses a Structural Vector Auto-Regression (SVAR)
approach to study the e¤ects of scal policy on a set of ve OECD countries. The author shows that
while, in general, tax multipliers are negative and small, one can also nd empirical support for positive
tax multipliers. Similarly, Baldacci et al. (2001) argue that, although research generally suggests small
and positive spending multipliers and small and negative tax multipliers, there is some evidence for both
negative spending multipliers and positive tax multipliers. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and Bradley and
Whelan (1997) also nd an expansionary e¤ect associated to contractionary scal policy, in particular,
when undertaken in a situation of public accounts distress and coordinated with an adequate exchange
rate policy. Non-Keynesian e¤ects may indeed emerge when the scal consolidation programme ap-
pears to the public as a serious attempt to reduce the public sector borrowing requirements. In that
case, an induced wealth e¤ect may emerge, leading to an increase in private consumption (Sutherland,
1997). However, if the scal consolidation is not seen as credible, then the negative Keynesian e¤ect on
consumption will prevail.
The response of the price level shows that is signicantly rises after the shock with the peak e¤ect
being reached after twelve quarters. This corroborates the scal theory of the price level that takes into
account monetary and scal policy interactions and assumes that scal policy may determine the price
level even if monetary authorities pursue an ination targeting strategy (Woodford, 1995).
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These ndings deserve some further comments. First, from a theoretical perspective, the structural
relationship between scal decit, interest rates and GDP can be interpreted as referring to the so-called
"crowding-out" e¤ect. Indeed, when governments run a budget decit and fund it by borrowing on the
domestic capital market (for instance, by selling Treasury Bills), they place an upward pressure on
real interest rates. This, in turn, stimulates savings in the private sector and discourages or "crowds-
out" private consumption and investment. Consequently, aggregate demand may fall. Second, scal
policy shocks may also a¤ect domestic interest rates through their impact on householdsand rms
expectations. For example, if agents believe that the increase in debt that is used to nance the budget
decit will be funded by a raise in future taxation - that is, if they act in a Ricardian manner -, then
one might observe an increase in current savings.7 Third, to the extent that agentsexpectations are
consistent with the existence of inationary e¤ects due to large budget decits, the increase in ination
(risk) premium will be embedded into interest rates and rise them. Once again, the nal e¤ect of the
upward adjustment in the interest rates will be a fall in the level of real GDP.
Table 3: Forecast-error variance decomposition.
Response to
Response of HOUSEt 1 GDPt 1 Pt 1 DEFICITt 1 IRt 1 EQt 1
HOUSEt 0.4579 0.0032 0.0076 0.0142 0.0610 0.4562
GDPt 0.0041 0.2879 0.0026 0.0012 0.0578 0.6464
Pt 0.0487 0.0425 0.1887 0.0179 0.0390 0.6631
DEFICITt 0.0193 0.0119 0.0166 0.4885 0.0270 0.4367
IRt 0.0629 0.0072 0.1913 0.0304 0.5033 0.2050
EQt 0.0050 0.0097 0.0243 0.0006 0.0471 0.9132
Note: Percent of variation in the row variable (thirty quarters-ahead) explained by the column variable.
In Table 3, we report the variance decomposition of the variables included in the PVAR at the
horizon of thirty quarters. Similarly, Figure 2 plots the forecast-error variance decomposition to a scal
policy shock over di¤erent time horizons. The evidence corroborates the previous ndings: unexpected
variation in the scal stance explains just a small fraction of the forecast-error variance decomposition
of stock prices (thin solid line), but it plays an important role in generating the dynamics of housing
prices.(thin and dotted line) even thirty quarters-ahead. In addition, scal shocks substantially and
persistently impact on prices and interest rates, which gives echo to the current developments in bond
markets, especially, given the di¢ culties faced by some highly-indebted governments in trying to raise
7Barro (1976) and Seater (1993) show that forward-looking consumers save the proceeds from a debt-nanced scal
stimulus in anticipation of the future tax increase needed to repay the additional government debt. Such Ricardian
behaviour implies that consumersnet wealth is invariant to a debt-nanced government expenditure increase.
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the necessary funds. Finally, the evolution of the forecast-error variance decomposition of GDP suggests
that scal policy plays a negligible role, which casts some doubts about the e¤ectiveness of the current
scal stimulus packages. Note, however, that these results have not been conditioned on the state of
the economy, a feature that may be crucial indeed.
Figure 2: Forecast-error variance decomposition: shock to scal policy.
An important question remains: do asset prices inuence the dynamics of scal policy? As discussed
in Section 1, there is very limited evidence on whether scal policy responds and/or is a¤ected by asset
price movements. From a theoretical perspective, Schuknecht and Eschenbach (2002) show that asset
prices can inuence government budget balances through a series of channels: (i) directly, via related
taxes on capital gains/losses; and (ii) indirectly, via a feedback e¤ect from asset prices to the economy. A
positive shock in asset prices may, therefore, have a counter-cyclical e¤ect on the budget balance, as the
additional government revenue would translate into a lower decit (or a higher surplus). Alternatively
(i.e. in the case of indirect e¤ects), higher asset prices can boost consumer condence, via the wealth
e¤ect, and lead to a rise in consumption. This, in turn, induces an increase in taxes, thereby, reducing
government decit.
In order to investigate the potential multidirectional linkage between scal policy and asset prices,
Figure 3 displays the impulse-response functions of scal policy to, respectively, a shock in housing
prices and a shock in stock prices. The evidence suggests that the e¤ects of asset price shocks on
scal policy are signicant and highly persistent. Interestingly, the negative response of scal decit
indicates that unexpected variation in asset prices contribute to scal consolidation. In particular, the
reduction of government decit seems larger in magnitude in the case of stock price shocks (a 2.4% fall
versus a 0.5% fall in the case of housing prices). This suggests that changes in stock prices (rather than
housing market movements) can play a prominent role towards the achievement of a sounder and more
sustainable scal stance.
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Figure 3: Impulse-response of DEFICITi;t to, respectively, a housing price (HOUSEi;t) and a equity
price (EQi;t) shock.
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6 Sensitivity Analysis
We now assess the robustness of the previous results in several directions. First, we investigate if the
e¤ectiveness of scal policy has changed over time. Second, we evaluate the role of scal deregulation
and the importance of the process of mortgage liberalization. Finally, we ask whether the scal stimulus
packages help boosting the recovery.
6.1 Have asset markets become more sensitive to scal policy?
This section examines whether the impact of scal policy on asset prices (and economic activity) has
changed over time. To that end, we estimate the PVAR model specied in (1) over two sub-periods:
1970:1-1984:4 and 1985:1-2007:4.
Figure 4 plots the impulse-response functions of asset prices and output to a shock in the scal
stance. In the rst sub-sample period (1970:1-1984-4), scal policy seems to have a positive impact
on economic activity. After a fall in the rst few quarters, GDP starts rising in a signicant manner.
In anticipation of the expansionary e¤ect on output, the demand for nancial assets increases and
stock prices quickly rise. In what concerns housing prices, our analysis suggests that the e¤ect of scal
policy tends to be signicantly negative only in the rst few quarters, and as a result of the "crowding-
out" e¤ect generated by the increase in interest rates. From the fth quarter onwards, housing prices
gradually recover and the impact of scal policy remains signicant even thirty quarters-ahead.
As for the second sub-sample period (1985:1-2007:4), the results displayed in Figure 5 show that
scal policy e¤ects are dramatically di¤erent. The pattern of the response of GDP suggests that, after
the mid eighties, the scal multiplier has become negative, therefore, providing evidence of a "Non-
Keynesian" e¤ect of scal policy. This result is consistent with the common wisdom that scal policy
e¤ects has substantially weakened over the last twenty years (Perotti, 2004). In the case of asset prices
and in contrast with the previous results, we nd that scal shocks impact negatively and persistently
on both housing and equity prices.
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A possible explanation for such asymmetric response of output and asset prices over the two sub-
samples may lay on the fact that nancial deregulation has progressively changed the degree of e¤ec-
tiveness of scal policy, as well as the way it is perceived by marketsparticipants. We investigate this
issue in the next sub-Section.
Figure 4: Impulse-response functions to a scal policy shock (sub-sample 1970:1-1984:4).
Response of HOUSE to Shock in DEFICIT
s
 (p 32) DEFICIT  DEFICIT
 (p 68) DEFICIT
0 30
-0.0054
0.0061
Response of GDP to Shock in DEFICIT
s
 (p 32) DEFICIT  DEFICIT
 (p 68) DEFICIT
0 30
-0.0006
0.0029
Response of P to Shock in DEFICIT
s
 (p 32) DEFICIT  DEFICIT
 (p 68) DEFICIT
0 30
-0.0020
0.0034
Response of DEFICIT to Shock in DEFICIT
s
 (p 32) DEFICIT  DEFICIT
 (p 68) DEFICIT
0 30
-0.0018
0.0736
Response of IR to Shock in DEFICIT
s
 (p 32) DEFICIT  DEFICIT
 (p 68) DEFICIT
0 30
-0.0302
0.9952
Response of EQ to Shock in DEFICIT
s
 (p 32) DEFICIT  DEFICIT
 (p 68) DEFICIT
0 30
-0.0074
0.0245
Figure 5: Impulse-response functions to a scal policy shock (sub-sample 1985:1-2007:4).
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6.2 Does nancial deregulation matter?
Until the early eighties, mortgage markets were, in general, highly regulated. Interest rate ceilings and
quantitative limits on credit and repayment periods often led to chronic or temporary credit rationing.
This made it di¢ cult for households to access credit and increased the sensitivity of demand to shocks
in disposable income (Girouard and Blondal, 2001). In this context, one would expect that the positive
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e¤ect on private income due to an expansionary scal policy also generates a rise in the demand of asset
markets and, consequently, asset prices.
In contrast, when the deregulation process started, credit constraints on households and rms become
more relaxed and access to mortgage credit broadened (Diamond and Lea, 1992). Because of the
enhanced opportunities to smooth consumption vis-a-vis temporary uctuations in income and to hedge
against unfavorable labour income shocks, householdsdemand may have become less dependent on
current income. Similarly, the incidence of mortgage market deregulation may signicantly a¤ect the
probability of extreme variations in asset prices (Agnello and Schuknecht, 2009). These features could
partially explain the high degree of uncertainty regarding the size of the e¤ect of scal shocks on GDP
in the post-1984 sub-sample.
In addition, the asymmetric response of asset prices that one observes for the two sub-samples may
be linked to the increase of competition in the banking sector. In fact, in a context of high degree
of liberalization and market integration, the competitiveness of the banking sector becomes strongly
dependent on the quality of national policys formulation and implementation, and on the credibility
of governments commitment to such policies. As a result, an expansionary scal policy might be
interpreted by markets as signalling a deterioration of public nances (Ardagna, 2009) or a lack of scal
discipline (Hallett et al., 2008). This, in turn, may induce the private sector to dramatically increase
savings and persistently reduce investment in housing and stock markets.
In order to uncover the dynamics behind the patterns of the impulse-response functions across
di¤erent sub-samples and support our predictions regarding the role played by the nancial deregulation,
we re-estimate the model specied by (1), namely, by accounting for the liberalization process of the
mortgage market in each country. Specically, we estimate a dummy-augmented PVAR model of the
form:
Yit =  0 +  BL(L)Yit DBLit +  AL(L)Yit DALit + fi + dc;t + "it; (2)
where Yit is the same vector of endogenous variables dened above, and DBLit and D
AL
it are dummy
variables that capture the process of deregulation in the mortgage markets. In particular, for each
country i, DBLit takes the value of one before the deregulation process started, and zero once it is in
place. Similarly, DALit takes the value of one after the deregulation process has taken place, and zero
otherwise.
Table 4 summarizes the starting dates of the most relevant nancial deregulation measures a¤ecting
the housing markets in the countries included in the sample. In the majority of countries, the process of
liberalization consisted of a deregulation of interest rates (Germany, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain)
or a lifting of credit controls (Finland, France and Italy).
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Table 4: Selected nancial deregulation measures a¤ecting the housing market.
Country Date Type of measurement
Belgium 1992 Introduction of variable interest rate loans and
reduction of the maximum early repayment fee
Germany 1967 Deregulation of interest rates
Finland 1986 Lifting of quantitative credit controls
Funding quotas from the Central Bank to commercial banks eliminated
France 1987 Lifting of credit controls
Bank specialization requirement reduced
Italy 1988 Permanent lifting of quantitative credit
controls (credit ceilings eliminated)
Netherlands 1980 Deregulation of interest rates
Portugal 1992 Deregulation of interest rates
Spain 1987 Deregulation of interest rates
United Kingdom 1986 Authorization granted to building societies
to extend their activity to mortgage loans
United States 1984 Removal of Regulation Q and
elimination of portfolio restrictions for thrifts
Note: Data are provided by Mehrez and Kaufmann (1999), Girouard and Blondal (2001), ECB (2003) and Debelle (2004).
 Although credit ceilings were o¢ cially eliminated in Italy in 1983, they were temporary reimposed in the period 1986-1987.
Figures 6 and 7 plot the impulse-response functions to a shock to scal policy, respectively, before
and after the deregulation process. The results corroborate our previous ndings and conjectures. In
particular, one can see that in a context of highly deregulated markets, scal policy may be particularly
ine¤ective. Most importantly, an expansionary scal policy may increase the vulnerability of real estate
and nancial markets. In fact, markets will immediately interpret the measure as a deterioration of the
scal stance and a threat to long-term sustainability of public nances (Hallett and Lewis, 2008). As a
result, both stock prices and housing prices signicantly and persistently fall in the "after deregulation"
period.
Figure 6: Impulse-responses to a scal policy shock (before deregulation).
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Figure 7: Impulse-responses to a scal policy shock (after deregulation).
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6.3 Can the scal stimulus packages help boosting recovery?
Financial crises can be contagious and damaging, and typically lead economies into recessions. Among
the many causes of nancial crises, one can refer: (i) credit booms; (ii) currency and maturity mis-
matches; (iii) large capital inows; and (iv) unsustainable macroeconomic policies (i.e., large current
account decits and rising public debt).
Asset prices constitute a critical link between macroeconomic, monetary and nancial stability (Raq
and Mallick, 2008; Sousa, 2010a, 2010c). History shows that signicant corrections in asset prices, from
their long-run equilibrium levels, may lead to nancial instability (in particular, in the banking system)
and, ultimately, to macroeconomic instability (Granville and Mallick, 2009). Moreover, situations of
busts in asset prices have important economic costs, in particular, in terms of GDP losses during the
post-boom phase (Jaeger and Schuknecht, 2007; Agnello and Schuknecht, 2009). The developments of
the most severe nancial crises (i.e., the Great Depression and the banking crisis of Japan in 1997)
also generated a global downturn, therefore, suggesting that monetary policy may have a limited scope
for further stimulus. Not surprisingly, in the context of the current global downturn characterized by
a sharp correction of both housing and stock prices, central banks and governments have called for
prompt and very expansionary scal policy measures. These have generally reallocated wealth toward
banks and debtors and away from taxpayers.
Table 5 summarizes, for the set of countries included in the sample, the scal stimulus packages
announced for 2009-2010. It shows the dramatic magnitude (in percentage of the GDP) of such policies,
in particular, in countries such as Spain (6.7%) and the U.S. (5.5%), but also in Finland (1.7%), Germany
(1.6%), France and Portugal (1.3%) and the Netherlands (1%).
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Table 5: Fiscal stimulus packages.
Country Amount ($ billions) %GDP
Belgium 2.5 0.6
Germany 103.3 1.6
Finland 2.6 1.7
France 33.0 1.3
Italy 6.3 0.3
Netherlands 7.5 1.0
Portugal 2.7 1.3
Spain 113.3 6.7
United Kingdom 36.3 0.9
United States 787.0 5.5
Note: Data come from Gallagher (2009).
Against this background, we assess the extent to which a scal stimulus contributes to the strength
of the economic recovery. Specically, we investigate whether scal policy shocks undertaken during
housing bust phases can have an important multiplier e¤ect on the economy. For instance, Ahearne et
al. (2005) examine periods of pronounced rises and falls of real housing prices since 1970 in eighteen
major industrial countries. The authors nd that housing price booms are typically preceded by a pe-
riod of easing monetary policy, but then diminishing slack and rising ination lead monetary authorities
to tighten policy before housing prices peak. Similarly, Agnello and Schuknecht (2009) analyze episodes
of booms and busts in real estate price in eighteen industrialized countries. The authors show that
recent housing booms have been very persistent and a number of policy variables (such as credit devel-
opments, global and local monetary conditions and short-term interest rates) are particularly important
in explaining the probability of a boom or bust.
To shed some light on this question, we estimate a dummy-augmented version of the PVAR specied
in (1). More specically, we consider the following model:
Yit =  0 +  B(L)Yit DBit +  NB(L)Yit DNBit + fi + dc;t + "it (3)
where Yit is the same vector of endogenous variables as dened above, DBit is a dummy variable that
is set equal to one in case of an episode of bust in the housing prices in period t in country i, and
zero, otherwise. Similarly, DNBit denes a dummy variable that takes the value of one in the absence of
housing price busts in period t in country i, and zero otherwise.
In order to detect the bust episodes, we use a non-parametric approach and, following Agnello and
Schuknecht (2009), we dene a bust in housing prices as a major and persistent downward deviation
from their trend computed by a one-sided Hodrick-Prescott (HP) lter with a smoothing parameter of
100,000. Therefore, a bust corresponds to a negative deviation (more than 5%) and persistent (at least
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twelve quarters) of housing prices from the trend.8 . Using this denition, we are able to identify the
bust episodes reported in Table 6.
Table 6: Episodes of busts in housing market.
Country Busts
Belgium 1983Q1-1989Q1
Germany 1975Q2-1979Q1; 1982Q21989Q4; 1996Q2-2007Q2
Finland 1970Q1-1972Q4; 1977Q2-1980Q4; 1990Q3-1997Q2
France 1971Q1-1973Q4; 1982Q1-1999Q2
Italy 1984Q3-1989Q1; 1993Q3-2001Q3
Netherlands 1980Q4-1986Q2; 2003Q3-2007Q3
Portugal 1995Q3-2000Q2; 2001Q3-2007Q4
Spain 1971Q2-1974Q1; 1980Q4-1986Q3; 1992Q2-2001Q4
United Kingdom 1975Q4-1979Q1; 1981Q4-1986Q2; 1990Q3-1998Q2
United States 1974Q4-1978Q1; 1981Q3-1988Q1; 1989Q4-1998Q2
Note: A bust is dened as a negative (more than 5%) and persistent (at least twelve quarters) deviation of housing prices from their
trend.
Figure 8 displays the impulse-response functions to a scal shock during busts in housing prices.
We can see that unexpected variation in the scal stance persistently drives up both housing and stock
prices. Consistent with the previous ndings, while the reaction of housing prices is gradual, stock
prices immediately adjust to the shock. Fiscal policy also has a positive and persistent e¤ect on GDP
in a Keynesian manner. This, therefore, suggests that a stimulus package implemented during a bust
in housing prices is likely to have the largest multiplier impact.
The e¤ectiveness of scal policy seems to be the result of both the "direct" e¤ects of policy measures
and the "indirect" e¤ects arising from movements in real interest rates. In a context where the private
sector is unwilling to spend and invest on asset prices, an expansionary scal policy stimulates aggregate
demand per se, namely, via public investment and public consumption (the "direct" e¤ect). In addition,
it may lead to a ip in expectations of market participants which can move from being deationary
to being inationary. In fact, as time goes by and scal policy exerts its expansionary e¤ects on
output, consumer and rms condence levels may be restored, inducing an upward revision in price
level expectations. This, in turn, leads to a reduction in real interest rates, thereby, amplifying the
overall size of the scal multiplier (the "indirect" e¤ect).
Summing up, in comparison with the results of the baseline model, one concludes that, conditioning
the e¤ects of scal policy on the occurrence of a bust in housing prices, there is a great scope for
short-term scal policy stimulus. In fact, our ndings suggest that in the presence of a strong fall in
aggregate demand and sharp corrections in real estate and nancial wealth, there is little room for
adverse interest rate adjustments. As a result, scal stimulus appears to be particularly helpful in
8The set of bust periods identied in this manner does not change when we consider an alternative denition, say a
negative (more than 10%) and persistent (at least twelve quarters) deviation of housing prices from their trend.
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boosting the economic recovery and less prone in crowding-out private spending.
Figure 8: Impulse-response function to a scal policy shock (evidence during housing price busts).
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7 Conclusion
The current nancial crisis has demonstrated that the nancial system, the housing sector, and the
banking sector are strongly connected and may a¤ect the nexus between monetary stability and nancial
stability (Castro, 2008; Granville and Mallick, 2009; Sousa, 2010a) and/or impinge on business cycle
(de)synchronization (Mallick and Mohsin, 2007, 2010). Moreover, its severity and persistent e¤ects
became key features of the assessment about the impact of macroeconomic variables on the likelihood
of an expansion and contraction ending (Castro, 2009; Agnello and Nerlich, 2010) or a boom-bust phase
in asset prices (Jaeger and Schuknecht, 2007). As a result, a quick response from monetary authorities
and the implementation of large scal stimulus packages by governments have become the most visible
features of the attempts to stimulate the economy and promote the recovery.
Despite this, the empirical linkages between scal policy innovations and asset markets have not
been explored and a good understanding of the transmission mechanism of scal policy measures to
asset prices has not been provided yet.
In the present work, we try to ll those gaps. Using a panel VAR and quarterly data for ten
industrialized countries, we show that a positive scal policy shock has a negative impact in both
stock prices and housing prices. However, while stock prices immediately adjust to the shock and the
e¤ect is merely temporary, housing prices exhibit strong persistence and remain depressed even thirty
quarters-ahead. As a result, governments may nd it quite di¢ cult to mitigate movements in stock
prices without disrupting the behaviour of housing markets.
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The robustness of the results is assessed in several directions. First, we nd that the expansionary
e¤ect of scal policy has somewhat weakened in the recent times and, as a result, asset markets became
more sensitive to a deterioration in the scal stance. Second, the process of nancial deregulation and
mortgage liberalization might have contributed to the change in the degree of e¤ectiveness of scal
policy, as the competitiveness of national banking sector becomes strongly related to the commitment
of government to credible sound policies. This, in turn, gives rise to the importance of scal discipline
(Hallett, 2008; Hallett et al., 2008). Third, we show that scal policy actions can have signicant
multiplier e¤ects when undertaken in the outcome of severe housing busts, therefore, suggesting the
importance of the implementation of scal stimulus packages.
While our paper focuses on the role that scal policy plays in leading asset price dynamics, one may
also question on whether asset prices inuence scal policy. We nd that stock price shocks impact
more on scal policy than housing price shocks. As a result, they may contribute more decisively to
the goal of scal consolidation.
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A Data Description
A.1 Belgium Data
GDP
The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics (series " IFS.Q.124.9.9B.B$$.Z.W.$$$"). We
seasonally adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period
1980:1-2007:3.
Price Deator
All variables were deated by the GDP deator (2000=100). The source is the IMF, International
Financial Statistics (series IFS.Q.124.9.9B.BIP.Z.F.$$$). We seasonally adjust quarterly data
using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 1980:1-2007:3.
Government Spending
The source is the Belgium Ministry of Finance. Government Spending is dened as State Government
expenditure on a cash basis (series BISM.M.FJHC.BE.91). We seasonally adjust quarterly data
using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 1967:1-2008:1.
Government Revenue
The source is the Belgium Ministry of Finance. Government Revenue is dened as State Government
revenue on a cash basis (series BISM.M.FJBC.BE.91). We seasonally adjust quarterly data
using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 1967:1-2008:1.
Housing Price
The source is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (series "QRPNBE"). The series comprise
the period 1970:1-2007:2.
Equity Price
The source is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (series "QEPNBE"). The series comprise
the period 1970:1-2007:4.
Interest Rate
Proxied by the Treasury Bill rate. The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics (series
"12460C..ZF..."). The series comprise the period 1960:1-2008:3.
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A.2 Finland Data
GDP
The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics (series " IFS.Q.172.9.9B.B$$.Z.W.$$$"). We
seasonally adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period
1970:1-2007:4
Price Deator
All variables were deated by the GDP deator (2000=100). The source is the IMF, International
Financial Statistics (series IFS.Q.172.9.9B.BIP.Z.F.$$). We seasonally adjust quarterly data
using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 1970:1-2007:4.
Government Spending
The source is the IMF via Finnish Ministry of Finance. Government Spending is dened as State
Government expenditure on a cash basis (series IFS.M.17282...ZF...). We seasonally adjust
quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 1970:1-2007:4.
Government Revenue
The source is the IMF via Finnish Ministry of Finance. Government Revenue is dened as State
Government revenue on a cash basis (series IFS.M.17281...ZF...). We seasonally adjust quarterly
data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 1970:1-2007:4.
Housing Price
The source is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (series "QRPNFI"). The series comprise
the period 1970:1-2007:4.
Equity Price
The source is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (series "QEPNFI"). The series comprise
the period 1970:1-2007:4.
Interest Rate
Proxied by the Central Bank rate. The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics (series
"17260...ZF..."). The series comprise the period 1960:1-2008:3.
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A.3 France Data
GDP
Data for GDP are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1970:1-2007:2. The source
is the IMF, International Financial Statistics (series " IFS.Q.132.9.9B.B$C.Z.F.$$$").
Price Deator
All variables were deated by the GDP deator (2000=100). Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted,
and comprise the period 1970:1-2007:2. The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics
(series IFS.Q.132.9.9B.BIR.Z.F.$$$).
Government Spending
The source is the IMF via French Ministry of Finance. Government Spending is dened as State
Government expenditure on a cash basis (series IFS.M.13282z..ZF...). We seasonally adjust
quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 1970:1-2007:2.
Government Revenue
The source is the IMF via French Ministry of Finance. Government Revenue is dened as State
Government revenue on a cash basis (series IFS.M.13281...ZF...). We seasonally adjust quarterly
data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 1970:1-2007:2.
Housing Price
The source is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (series "QRPNFR"). The series comprise
the period 1970:1-2007:4.
Equity Price
The source is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (series "QEPNFR"). The series comprise
the period 1970:1-2007:4.
Interest Rate
Proxied by the Treasury Bill rate. The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics (series
"13260C..ZF..."). The series comprise the period 1970:1-2008:3.
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A.4 Germany Data
GDP
Data for GDP are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1960:1-2007:4. The source
is the IMF, International Financial Statistics (series "IFS.Q.134.9.9B.B$C.Z.F.$$$").
Price Deator
All variables were deated by the GDP deator (2000=100). Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted,
and comprise the period 1960:1-2007:2. The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics
(series "IFS.Q.134.9.9B.BIR.Z.F.$$$).
Government Spending
The source is the Bundesbank and the Monthly Reports released by the German Ministry of Finance.
Government Spending is dened as General Government total expenditure on a cash basis. We
seasonally adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period
1979:1-2007:3.
Government Revenue
The source is the Bundesbank and the Monthly Reports released by the German Ministry of Fi-
nance. Government Revenue is dened as General Government total revenue on a cash basis. We
seasonally adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period
1979:1-2007:3.
Housing Price
The source is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (series "QRPNDE"). The series comprise
the period 1970:1-2007:4.
Equity Price
The source is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (series "QEPNDE"). The series comprise
the period 1970:1-2007:4.
Interest Rate
Proxied by the Treasury Bill rate. The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics (series
"13460C..ZF..."). The series comprise the period 1975:3-2007:2.
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A.5 Italy Data
GDP
Data for GDP are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1960:1-2007:3. The source
is the IMF, International Financial Statistics (series "IFS.Q.136.9.9B.B$C.Z.F.$$$").
Price Deator
All variables were deated by the GDP deator (2000=100). Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted,
and comprise the period 1980:1-2007:2. The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics
(series IFS.Q.136.9.9B.BIR.Z.F.$$$).
Government Spending
The source is the Bank of Italy and the Italian Ministry of Finance. Government Spending is dened
as Central Government primary expenditure on a cash basis. We seasonally adjust quarterly data
using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 1960:1-2007:4.
Government Revenue
The source is the Bank of Italy and the Italian Ministry of Finance. Government Revenue is dened
as Central Government total revenue on a cash basis. We seasonally adjust quarterly data using
Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 1960:1-2007:4.
Housing Price
The source is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (series "QRPNIT"). The series comprise
the period 1970:1-2007:4.
Equity Price
The source is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (series "QEPNIT"). The series comprise
the period 1970:1-2007:4.
Interest Rate
Proxied by the Treasury Bill rate. The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics (series
"13660C..ZF..."). The series comprise the period 1977:1-2008:3.
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A.6 Netherlands Data
GDP
The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics (series " IFS.Q.138.9.9B.B$C.Z.W.$$$"). We
seasonally adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period
1970:1-2007:4.
Price Deator
All variables were deated by the GDP deator (2000=100). The source is the IMF, International
Financial Statistics (series IFS.Q.138.9.9B.BIR.Z.F.$$$). We seasonally adjust quarterly data
using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 1970:1-2007:2.
Government Spending
The source is the IMF via Dutch Ministry of Finance. Government Spending is dened as State
Government expenditure on a cash basis (series IFS.M.138.C.C2.$$$.C.G.$$$). We seasonally
adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 1970:1-2007:1.
Government Revenue
The source is the IMF via Dutch Ministry of Finance. Government Revenue is dened as State
Government revenue on a cash basis (series IFS.M.138.C.C1.$$$.C.G.$$$). We seasonally adjust
quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 1970:1-2007:1.
Housing Price
The source is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (series "QRPNNL"). The series comprise
the period 1970:1-2007:4.
Equity Price
The source is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (series "QEPNNL"). The series comprise
the period 1970:1-2007:4.
Interest Rate
Proxied by the Government Bond Yield. The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics
(series "13861...ZF..."). The series comprise the period 1960:1-2008:3.
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A.7 Portugal Data
GDP
The source is the Bank of Portugal. We seasonally adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA,
and the series comprise the period 1978:1-2007:4.
Price Deator
All variables were deated by the GDP deator (2000=100). Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted,
and comprise the period 1978:1-2007:4. The source is the Bank of Portugal.
Government Spending
The source is the Bank of Portugal, collected from the Monthly Bulletin of the Directorate-General of
Public Accounting. Government Spending is dened as Central Government primary spending (on
a cash basis), that is, the di¤erence between authorized expenditure and debt interest payments.
We seasonally adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period
1978:1-2007:4.
Government Revenue
The source is the Bank of Portugal, collected from the Monthly Bulletin of the Directorate-General
of Public Accounting. Government Revenue is dened as Central Government total revenue (on
a cash basis). We seasonally adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series
comprise the period 1978:1-2007:4.
Housing Price
The source is the European Central Bank (ECB). The series comprise the period 1988:1-2007:4.
Equity Price
The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics (series "IFS.Q.18262...ZF..."). The series
comprise the period 1988:1-2007:4.
Interest Rate
Proxied by the Government Bond Yield. The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics
(series "IFS.Q.18261...ZF..."). The series comprise the period 1960:1-2008:3.
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A.8 Spain Data
GDP
Data for GDP are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1970:1-2007:2. The source
is the IMF, International Financial Statistics (series " IFS.Q.184.9.9B.B$C.Z.F.$$$").
Price Deator
All variables were deated by the GDP deator (2000=100). Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted,
and comprise the period 1970:1-2007:2. The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics
(series IFS.Q.184.9.9B.BIR.Z.F.$$$).
Government Spending
The source is the IMF via Spanish Ministry of Finance. Government Spending is dened as State
Government expenditure on a cash basis (series IFS.M.18482...Zf...). We seasonally adjust
quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 1985:1-2006:4.
Government Revenue
The source is the IMF via Spanish Ministry of Finance. Government Revenue is dened as State
Government revenue on a cash basis (series IFS.M.18481...Zf...). We seasonally adjust quarterly
data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 1986:1-2006:4.
Housing Price
The source is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (series "QRPNES"). The series comprise
the period 1971:1-2007:4.
Equity Price
The source is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (series "QEPNES"). The series comprise
the period 1970:1-2007:4.
Interest Rate
Proxied by the Treasury Bill rate. The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics (series
"18460C..ZF..."). The series comprise the period 1979:1-2008:3.
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A.9 U.K. Data
GDP
Data for GDP are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1955:1-2007:4. The source
is the O¢ ce for National Statistics, Release UKEA, Table A1 (series "YBHA").
Price Deator
All variables were deated by the GDP deator. Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise
the period 1955:1-2007:4. The source is the O¢ ce for National Statistics, Release MDS, Table 1.1
(series YBGB).
Government Spending
The source is the O¢ ce for National Statistics (ONS), Release Public Sector Accounts. Government
Spending is dened as total current expenditures of the Public Sector ESA 95 (series ANLT)
less net investment (series ANNW). We seasonally adjust quarterly data using Census X12
ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 1947:1-2007:4.
Government Revenue
The source is the O¢ ce for National Statistics (ONS), Release Public Sector Accounts. Government
Revenue is dened as total current receipts of the Public Sector ESA 95 (series ANBT). We
seasonally adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period
1947:1-2007:4.
Housing Price
The source is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (series "QRPNGB"). The series comprise
the period 1970:1-2007:4.
Equity Price
The source is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (series "QEPNGB"). The series comprise
the period 1970:1-2007:4.
Interest Rate
Proxied by the Treasury Bill rate. The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics (series
"11260C..ZF..."). The series comprise the period 1960:1-2008:2.
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A.10 U.S. Data
GDP
The source is Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 1.1.5, line 1. Data for GDP are quarterly,
seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1947:1-2007:4.
Price Deator
All variables were deated by the GDP deator. Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise
the period 1967:1-2007:4. The source is the Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Tables 1.1.5 and
1.1.6, line 1.
Government Spending
The source is Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 3.2. Government Spending is dened as total
Federal Government Current Expenditure (line 39). Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and
comprise the period 1960:1-2007:4.
Government Revenue
The source is Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 3.2. Government Revenue is dened as gov-
ernment receipts at annual rates (line 36). Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise
the period 1947:1-2007:4.
Housing Price
The source is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (series "QRPNUS"). The series comprise
the period 1970:1-2007:4.
Equity Price
The source is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (series "QEPNUS"). The series comprise
the period 1970:1-2007:4.
Interest Rate
Proxied by the Treasury Bill rate. The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics (series
"11160C..ZF..."). The series comprise the period 1960:1-2008:3.
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